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Once known as the „English Disease,‰ hooliganism (or spectator-related football vio-
lence) is now a routine feature in most European football leagues. In Sweden, the number 
of serious violent offences in conjunction with football matches has steadily continued to 
mount over the last four decades. Presently, one of the worst culprits is Djurgårdens Fina 
Grabbar ă DFG (DjurgårdenÊs Fine Lads), the so-called „firm‰ (or hooligan group) 
associated with Djurgårdens Idrottsförening ă DIF (DjurgårdenÊs Athletic Association). 
DIFÊs supporters have long looked to Britain for inspiration; and this tendency is very 
marked in DFG. Yet, in the past few years, a new Italian-inspired variety of hooliganism 
has likewise become more and more detectable in DFGÊs actions. This, in turn, has led 
to a new hybrid, that is neither wholly Italian nor British in character ă though it has 
unquestionably created a more menacing version of Swedish hooliganism. This article 
accounts for this change in DFG while simultaneously exploring questions relating to 
the continued sanctity of local identities in the context of an increasingly globalized 
football culture. It additionally asks whether Swedish hooliganism should be understood 
as a response to the challenges facing traditional masculine identities in post-industrial 
societies like Sweden that also strongly emphasize gender equality.
Jadis appelé ÿ la maladie anglaise Ÿ, le hooliganisme (ou la violence des spectateurs au 
football) fait dorénavant partie du décor de la plupart des ligues de football européennes. 
En Suède, le nombre de crimes de violence graves liés à des matches de football ne cesse 
de se multiplier depuis quatre décennies. ¤ lÊheure actuelle, lÊun des pires coupables se 
nomme les Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar, ou DFG (les bons garçons de Djurgården), la 
pseudo ÿ firme Ÿ (ou groupe hooligan) associée au club Djurgårdens Idrottsförening, le 
DIF (qui se traduit littéralement par association athlétique Djurgården). Les partisans 
du DIF sÊinspirent depuis longtemps de la Grande-Bretagne, et cette tendance est 
très marquée chez les DFG. Mais voilà que les DFG exhibent aussi de plus en plus 
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ces dernières années les signes dÊune nouvelle variété de hooliganisme dÊinspiration 
italienne dans leurs actions. Si lÊhybride qui en a résulté nÊest ni tout à fait italien, ni tout 
à fait britannique, il ne sÊagit pas moins dÊune version indiscutablement plus menaçante 
de hooliganisme suédois. LÊarticle examine ce changement intervenu chez les DFG tout 
en explorant des questions en lien avec la sacro-sainte identité locale dans le contexte 
dÊune culture du football de plus en plus mondiale. On sÊy demande également si le 
hooliganisme suédois ne serait pas une réaction aux défis auxquels font face les identités 
masculines traditionnelles au sein de sociétés post-industrielles telles que la Suède, où 
lÊon valorise aussi beaucoup lÊégalité des sexes.
ONCE KNOWN as the “English Disease,” hooliganism (or spectator-related 
football violence) is now a routine feature in most European football leagues. If 
anything, this problem is actually worsening in many parts of Europe, even as it 
shows signs of decline in the United Kingdom. In Sweden, the number of serious 
violent offences in conjunction with football matches has steadily continued to 
mount over last four decades. Presently, one of the worst culprits is Djurgårdens 
Fina Grabbar (DFG – Djurgården’s Fine Lads), the so-called “firm” (or hoo-
ligan group) associated with Djurgårdens Idrottsförening (DIF – Djurgården’s 
Athletic Association). DIF is one of Stockholm’s three major football clubs.1
DIF’s supporters have long looked to Britain for inspiration; and this ten-
dency is very marked in DFG. Yet, in the past few years, a new Italian-inspired 
variety of hooliganism has likewise become more and more detectable in DFG’s 
actions. No longer content just to brawl with opposing fans and the police, DFG 
now also seeks to have a direct say in internal club affairs. This development, 
however, has only come about due to specific local circumstances – and not 
through any conscious emulation of Italian hooliganism on DFG’s part. This, 
in turn, has spawned a new hybrid, that is neither wholly Italian nor British in 
character – though it has unquestionably created a more menacing version of 
Swedish hooliganism.
Thus rather than producing a carbon copy of either of these two foreign alter-
natives, one can instead observe a creolization process, in which DFG’s conduct 
is currently shaped by a combustible mixture of local and foreign influences. All 
of this has contributed to a noticeable radicalization in DFG’s behaviour, as is evi-
denced by the group’s stepped up aggression against the members of its own club. 
This historical case study, the first on contemporary Swedish hooliganism, traces 
DFG’s evolution from the group’s inception in the summer of 1995 through the 
end of the 1999 football season, which culminated with a pitch invasion in which 
 1 Founded in 1891, DIF sponsors teams in a wide variety of sports, though most notably in ice hockey and 
football. Djurgården Football was first established in 1899, and historically it has also been one of the most 
successful teams in Sweden. The team has played over 50 seasons in the top Swedish division, Allsvenskan 
(the all-Swedish league), and has won the Swedish championship 11 times, most recently in 2002, 2003, and 
2005. In addition, the club has won the Swedish Cup on four occasions, including in 2002, 2004, and 2005. 
Internationally, however, the team has not enjoyed nearly as much success, never reaching beyond the second 
elimination round in the Champions League (or the third elimination round in the UEFA-Cup). DIF website, 
http://www.dif.se/sidor/?klubbfakta and www.dif.se/sidor/?historia, accessed May 19, 2010.
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members of DFG assaulted four players from the opposing team.2 The change in 
Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar raises questions relating to the continued sanctity of 
local identities in the context of an increasingly globalized football culture. Addi-
tionally, this study asks whether hooliganism should be understood as a response 
to the challenges facing traditional masculine identities in post-industrial societ-
ies like Sweden that also strongly emphasize gender equality.
By continental standards, the hooligan problem in Sweden is still relatively 
benign. Compared to the rest of Scandinavia, however, Sweden nevertheless 
faces the biggest troubles with spectator-related football violence, and histori-
cally this has always been the case.3 Sweden saw its first hooligan-connected 
death in 2002,4 and everyone closely involved with the sport agrees that the 
situation is worsening.5 The police are particularly concerned that the age of the 
perpetrators is creeping downward and that the new young generation of hooli-
gans is far more ruthless than their older counterparts.6
As elsewhere in Europe,7 this phenomenon appears in no small part to be fuelled 
by the media’s seemingly insatiable appetite for hooligan-related stories. Indeed, 
both Swedish club officials and police authorities complain that the intense media 
coverage not only encourages more violence, but also ensures a steady flow of 
new recruits in to the country’s rapidly growing number of hooligan groups.8 As a 
consequence, spectator violence is currently subject to an intense societal debate 
in Sweden,9 even at the highest levels of government.10 In hopes of curbing this 
problem, Swedish authorities and football clubs have adopted a series of new 
security measures generally modelled after British precedents.11
 2 In British football terminology, the field is referred to as a “pitch.”
 3 Torbjörn Andersson and Aage Radmann, “Football Fans in Scandinavia 1900-1997” in Adam Brown, ed., 
Fanatics! Power, Identity and Fandom in Football (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 141-158; “Cross-
national Variations on Football Violence in Europe,” Social Issues Research Centre website, http://www.sirc.
org/publik/fvcross.html, accessed July 17, 2008.
 4 In late August 2002, Tony Deogan was killed after an altercation between hooligans associated with AIK and 
IFK Göteborg. Tony Deogan, Blodsbröder. En sann historia (Malmö: Bra Böker, 2009), pp. 201-210.
 5 Bengt Madsen, chairman of Malmö FF, as cited in “De kostar oss 100 miljoner,” Aftonbladet, May 6, 2005; 
Charlie Granfelt, spokesman for AIK Football, as cited in “Utvecklingen skrämmer mig,” Dagens Nyheter, 
September 25, 2008.
 6 “Vi älskar att slåss,” Aftonbladet, October 12, 2007; Hans Löfdahl, supporter police in Stockholm, as cited in 
“Fotbollsvåldet kryper ner i åldrarna,” Svenska Dagbladet, May 23, 2008. In 1992, Swedish police authorities 
established a special detail to deal with spectator-related football violence.
 7 Steve Frosdick and Peter Marsh, Football Hooliganism (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2005), pp. 113-124.
 8 Bo Lundquist, chairman of DIF Football, as cited in “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 
2008, http://www.Sportstory.se, accessed January 10, 2010; Östen Gustafsson, supporter police in Gothen-
burg, as cited in “Huliganlivet: Våld, droger och dyra märkeskläder,” Göteborgs Posten, October 22, 2005.
 9 “Huliganer vann över fotbollen,” Dagens Nyheter, March 19, 2004; “Huliganerna måste stoppas,” Dagens 
Nyheter, February 9, 2007.
10 Göran Persson, Prime Minster of Sweden, as cited in “Tack för ett bra initiativ,” Aftonbladet, April 17, 
2005; Madeleine Sjöstedt, Minster of Culture and Sport, as cited in “Utvecklingen skrämmer mig,” Dagens 
Nyheter, September 25, 2008.
11 “Off side – Hulganismen flyttar ut från arenorna,” Apropå. Brottsförbygganderådets Tidskrift (2007), no. 4, 
pp. 5-11; “Nya krafttag mot huliganera,” Dagens Nyheter, April 9, 2009.
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In Sweden hooliganism is largely rooted at the club level and is less associ-
ated with the national team (though it certainly occurs at the national level as 
well).12 Traditionally this problem has been mostly linked to the major big city 
clubs such as AIK, Djurgården, and Hammarby in Stockholm and IFK Göteborg 
in Gothenburg. Yet, in recent years, it has also become more and more of an 
issue for teams such as Malmö FF, Helsingborgs IF, and GAIS (which is one 
of IFK Göteborg’s cross-town rivals).13 Over the last decade or so, hooliganism 
has likewise begun to make inroads in many smaller rural communities and in 
even new sports like Bandy (a hybrid of football and hockey).14 In this context, 
it should be emphasized that in Sweden spectator violence has frequently been 
as tied to ice hockey as it has been to football. This is largely explained by the 
fact that Djurgården and AIK have always fielded teams in both sports. In the last 
15 years, however, the problem has once again become mostly identified with 
football, at least in the big cities.
Sweden actually has a long history of spectator-related football disturbances 
that dates as far back as the interwar period, if not earlier.15 Still, such incidents 
only became more frequent and more “anglicized” in the 1970s. The birth of con-
temporary hooliganism in Sweden is often said to have been two “pitch invasions” 
by IFK Göteborg supporters in 1969 and 1970. Although spectator-related vio-
lence would intermittently continue to plague IFK Göteborg,16 by the early 1980s 
the locus of Swedish hooliganism had nevertheless decisively shifted to Stock-
holm, where, at first, it was chiefly expressed in reoccurring clashes between fans 
of AIK and Djurgården – usually in conjunction with local hockey derbies.17
At the time, this escalation in fan violence was undeniably a testament to 
the increased English influence on Swedish sports – and on Swedish football 
in particular. The game originally arrived in Sweden from the British Isles at 
the turn of the twentieth century, but Britain’s impact on Swedish football was 
greatly reinforced after 1969, when matches from the English Primer League 
first became weekly fare on Swedish television.18 Under this influence, Swedes 
increasingly came to adopt a “British style of play,” a tendency further encour-
aged by the importation of English coaches or managers.19
12 “DFG Historia” (2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com, accessed July 24, 2009.
13 Henrik Qvist, supporter police in Malmö, as cited in “Bokar tid – för att slåss,” Aftonbladet, May 7, 2005; Östen 
Gustafsson as cited in “Huliganlivet: Våld, droger och dyra märkeskläder,” Göteborgs Posten, October 22, 2005.
14 Inrikesdepartementet, Gemensamt arbete mot våld (Stockholm: Regeringskansliet, 1997), pp. 20-22.
15 Torbjörn Andersson, “Swedish Football Hooliganism,” Soccer and Society, vol. 2 (2001), no. 1, pp. 1-18.
16 “Firmorna får för mycket makt,” Aftonbladet, August 2, 2002; Tore Brännberg, “Huliganism – ett mångfal-
digt begrepp,” in Inrikesdepartementet, Våldet och glädjen, En debattbok om huliganer och glada supportrar 
(Stockholm: SISU Idrottsböker, 1997), pp. 15-16.
17 “Från flyttat mål till mord. Den svenska huliganismens svarta historia,” Aftonbladet, August 3, 2002; Stefan 
Nyberg, “Vi slogs för AIK” in Erling Bjurström, ed., Sporten eller livet. En antologi om huliganism, kropps-
fixering och idrottsliga ideal (Stockholm: Heatwave förlag, 1996), pp. 55-56.
18 Magnus Hagström, Peter Johansson, and Carl Jurell, Va för jävla pack e ni? (Stockholm: Imperial Publishing, 
2010), pp. 26-27, 51.
19 Bosse Andersson, former chairman of DIF Football, as cited by Henrik Ystén, Drömmen om Europa. Djurgården 
will mer . . . (Viborg, DK: Offside Press AB, 2004), p. 53.
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The rising British influence, however, was not limited to the pitch, but was 
equally evident on the terraces (“stands” in North America). From the beginning 
Swedish fan culture has been deeply indebted to British norms, and this only 
became more and more pronounced in the late postwar period.20 This develop-
ment was probably best exemplified by the anglicized names that the newly cre-
ated Swedish supporter groups gave themselves in the early 1980s, at which time 
AIK’s fans, for instance, assumed the moniker Black Army (from Manchester 
United’s Red Army),21 while Djurgården’s supporters eventually became known 
as the Blue Saints (after the well-known English football chant “Oh, when the 
Saints”).22 The strong bond between Swedish and British fan cultures has sub-
sequently been bolstered by an emerging pattern of Swedish football tourism to 
the United Kingdom.23
Such tourism includes hooliganism, and a few of the early seminal figures in 
the Stockholm hooligan scene are said to have had first-hand personal experi-
ence of British football violence. To this day, British hooliganism is the gold 
standard against which Swedes measure themselves, and British hooligans are 
still viewed by their Swedish neophytes with an equal dose of awe and inferi-
ority.24 The United Kingdom likewise continues to serve as a “school” of sorts 
for Swedish hooligans, as is highlighted by DFG’s repeated trips to London to 
meet with members of West Ham United’s notorious hooligan group the “Inner 
City Firm” (ICF.)25 Members of the ICF have, in turn, visited DFG in Stock-
holm, and over the years Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar has cultivated relations 
with a number of other foreign hooligan groups as well, including the infamous 
“Millwall Bushwackers.”26 (On an unrelated, but more menacing note, in the 
summer of 2009, DFG apparently hosted a small delegation of reputed IRA men 
in Stockholm.)27
Beyond these direct contacts, the bond with British hooliganism is primarily 
maintained through the Internet, though British conventions are additionally dis-
seminated through so-called “hooligan lit” (generally memoirs of former British 
20 Torbjörn Andersson and Aage Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan? Svensk fotbollskultur för och nu 
(Stockholm: Bokförlag Symposium, 1998). For a specific illustration, see DFG member “Krille” as cited in 
“Rätt klädd för fotbollsfajt,” Svenska Dagbladet, November 7, 2003.
21 Per-Olof Sännås, Black Army (Södertälje: Ljungbergs Trykeri, 1998), pp. 7-11.
22 Lars Grimlund and Fredric Pavalidis, Djurgården. En supporters handbok (Stockholm: Bokförlaget DN, 
2004), p. 86.
23 “Han är ledaren för järngänget,” Expressen, November 11, 1995; “Så levde han under jakten,” Aftonbladet, 
September 22, 2003. Both of these articles describe football trips by DIF hooligans to England.
24 Johan Höglund, En av grabbarna (Stockholm: MMG Books AB, 2005), pp. 43, 60-61, 64, 116, 138-144; 
Sännås, Black Army, pp. 49-51.
25 “Thanks to the West Ham Boys” (September 19, 2007) and “En härlig Påskhelg med I.C.F” (March 21, 2008), 
http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008. DIF hooligans have looked to West Ham for inspi-
ration since the early 1990s (“Blue Saints, Bajen Fans, Black Army,” Dagens Nyheter, November 8, 1995).
26 Author interview with Stockholm supporter police Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; 
“Shebeen” (May 4, 2007), DFG BLOG, http://www.copac.se/blog, accessed October 13, 2009. See also 
Deogan, Blodsbröder, p. 194.
27 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, head of security, DIF Football, June 18, 2010.
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hooligans) as well as through feature films dealing with this subject (such as 
CASS, The Firm, The Football Factory)28 These connections support the fre-
quently made point that globalization is not necessarily a top-down process, as 
non-elite – and even socially stigmatized – groups often play just as important a 
role in facilitating transnational cultural phenomena.
In practical terms, Swedish hooligans have notably followed the British example 
of coalescing into smaller units – into firms composed of only the most hard-core 
violent fans of each club. (In British slang “a firm” originally referred to a crimi-
nal syndicate, but the term was later also adopted by English football hooligans.)29 
These firms normally exist as separate entities outside the larger official supporter 
clubs and are, in turn, broken down into various age groups, with younger hoo-
ligans essentially serving a type of apprenticeship in “baby firms” before being 
admitted into the main adult firm.30 At one point, DFG claimed to have three 
such subgroups, Djurgårdens Mindre Grabbar (DMG – Djurgården’s Smaller 
Lads), Djurgårdens Yngsta (DY – Djurgården’s Youngest), and Djurgårdens Baby 
Grabbar (DBG – Djurgården’s Baby Lads).31 DFG further boasts that it was the 
first hooligan group in Sweden to have its own “baby firm.” (Babyfirman was 
established in 1992 by a number of younger DIF hooligans in the city’s southern 
suburbs, though the group was later subsumed into DFG.)32
Swedish hooligans have similarly copied the British practice of facing off in 
pre-arranged fights that generally take place in locations well removed from the 
stadium in an attempt to escape police detection and intervention. In Sweden, 
these clashes now normally follow well-established rules (no weapons, a prom-
ise to field the same number of combatants) While these rules are not always 
followed, the violence is nevertheless highly ritualized – if not totally risk-free 
for participants.33 In addition, these clashes are frequently filmed and then posted 
on the Internet, so that the participants can admire their own handiwork.34 Conse-
quently there appears to be a high degree of exhibitionism in hooligan violence, 
presumably intended for both a national and international audience.35
28 “Snart kommer någon att dö,” Expressen, November 8, 1995; Tore Brännberg, professor of social psychology 
at the University of Gothenburg, as cited in “Bokar tid – för att slåss,” Aftonbladet, May 7, 2005.
29 http://www.slangdictionary.com/definition/firm.html, accessed June 26, 2011.
30 Hans Lödahl as cited in “Antalet fotbollshulliganer ökar i Sverige,” Svenska Dagbladet, October 23, 2007.
31 http://www.facebook.com/pages/DFG, accessed April 1, 2009. At the moment, the supporter police in 
Stockholm believe that only DY (Djurgården’s Youngest) is still operating (author interview with Stig-Örjan 
Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010).
32 “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige” (2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008.
33 “Huliganer möttes i jätteslagsmål,” Dagens Nyheter, April 1, 2007; “Här drabbar huliganerna samman,” 
Expressen, March 2, 2009. For example, during both of these fights DFG’s members wore either black or 
white clothing to be better able to distinguish themselves from their opponents. See also “DIF-Gnaget” (April 
1, 2007), http://www.joe-sthlm.blogspot.com, accessed June 17, 2010; “Wisemen vs DFG,” http://www.
youtube.com, accessed August 19, 2010.
34 “Tack för en skön eftermiddag,” Svenska Dagbladet, May 23, 2005. For specific illustrations, see “Dfg vs. KGB” 
(2006) and “Djurgården’s Hooligans DMG at it again,” http://www.youtube.com, accessed October 1, 2009.
35 “Huliganvåldet. Firmorna väljer våldet före sporten,” Dagens Nyheter, August 3, 2000; “Fotbolls-Mordet. Huli-
ganerna försvann – ‘firmorna’ tog över,” Expressen, August 3, 2002.
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Last but not least, the general outward aesthetic of Swedish hooliganism 
likewise bears an unmistakable British imprint, which is also true of Scandina-
vian football culture more generally.36 Profoundly influenced by the so-called 
“Casual culture” that emerged on the British terraces in late 1970s (a scene that 
eventually also gave birth to the firms), Swedish hooligans have, for instance, 
conspicuously embraced the designer brands worn by their British counterparts. 
The specific brand names have changed over time, but they have always been 
high-end ones like Lacoste and Pringle or, more recently, Stone Island. This 
emulation of British fashion trends has been especially pronounced among the 
members of the firms associated with the three major Stockholm clubs37 and 
with Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar specifically.38
Since its inception, DFG has distinguished itself for its loyalty to all things 
British – to a fault, in the eyes of its local adversaries.39 The firm’s members, 
however, are absolutely unapologetic about this fact and candidly discuss their 
frequent shopping trips to England, as well as their close monitoring of British 
cultural and fashion trends.40 Perhaps more to the point – unlike, for example, 
AIK’s hooligans41 – DFG’s members have never publicly expressed any inter-
est in either Italian or other southern European varieties of football violence. To 
them, British hooliganism is seemingly the only role model that counts.
That DFG, in particular, would look to England for inspiration is not really all 
that surprising given that the club’s current supporter club, Järnkaminera (JK) – 
which might roughly be translated as the “Iron Stoves” – is equally explicit about 
its Anglophile tendencies.42 (Both have carried this heritage with them from the 
earlier Blue Saints’ era.)43 Still, over the last decade, new Italian influences have 
also made themselves apparent among Järnkaminera and its affiliated tifo-group, 
Fabriken (the Factory). Fabriken is responsible for the choreographed flag and 
pyrotechnic displays that now enliven Djurgården’s “end” or curva during big 
36 Richard Giulianotti and Gerry P. T. Finn, “Old Visions, Old Issues – New Horizons, New Openings? Change, 
Continuity, and other Contradictions in World Football” in Richard Giulianotti and Gerry P. T. Finn, eds., 
Football Culture: Local Contests, Global Visions (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 269.
37 “Casuals” (July 24, 2004), http://www.sverigescenen.com, accessed July 14, 2008; “Rätt klädd för fotbolls-
fajt,” Svenska Dagbladet, November 7, 2003. For a visual overview of DFG’s members, see “DFG ‘Allmäna 
idiotklubbens horungar’,” http://www.youtube.com, accessed August 19, 2010.
38 “Huliganerna: Det är en superaggressiv stämning just nu,” Expressen, February 12, 2004.
39 Höglund, En av grabbarna, pp. 105, 140; Sännås, Black Army, pp. 120-122.
40 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor. 
See also “Johan,” one of DFG’s alleged leaders, as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 
2005.
41 Höglund, En av grabbarna, pp. 107, 120-121; Hagström et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 98-99.
42 “Info om JK,” http;//www.jarnkaminerna.se, accessed July 24, 2009; “Järnkaminerna,” http://sv.wikepedia.
org, accessed July 24, 2009. In addition to JK, which is primarily oriented toward the club’s younger fans 
who stand in the terraces, DIF football also has two supporter groups for older, more well-established fans: 
Djurgårdens Supporters Club (DSC) and Sällskapet Gamla Djurgårdare (Grimlund and Pavalidis, Djurgården. 
En supporters handbok, pp. 86-87).
43 “Blue Saints, Bajen Fans, Black Army,” Dagens Nyheter, November 8, 1995. See also Hagström et al., Va för 
jävla pack e ni?, pp. 37-38, 85.
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games, such as the team’s derbies against AIK and Hammarby.44 The introduc-
tion of these new visual elements represented a departure from the singing-based 
fan culture found in England, and the creation of these displays additionally 
required far more internal organization among supporters, as well as collective 
effort between matches. As was the case in Germany, the tifo phenomenon was 
pioneered by a younger generation of fans;45 in Djurgården’s case, this develop-
ment initially met some resistance from the club’s older supporters, who still 
wished to remain loyal to earlier Anglophile traditions.46
Because of these reservations, Djurgården’s fans were slower to embrace 
these new Italian elements than their counterparts in the other two big Stock-
holm clubs, who were less concerned about preserving the purity of the ear-
lier British practices.47 The “Italianization” of Swedish fan culture is a direct 
result of the Internet revolution and the vast expansion of cable television, which 
has given Italian football much greater exposure in Sweden than previously.48 
The growing impact of Italian supporter culture is now evident in many parts 
of Europe,49 and in Sweden this has consequently created a novel fusion that 
mixes well-established British football traditions with newer Italian influences. 
This tendency is even discernible among DIF’s self-proclaimed Anglophile 
hooligans – albeit only in a vicarious way.
In many respects DFG’s members are not all that different from the club’s 
other fans. Both groups, for instance, have the (slightly misleading) reputation 
of being “upper-class snobs.”50 This undoubtedly stems from the fact that DIF’s 
home arena, Stadion, is located in one of the most exclusive districts in Stock-
holm, Östermalm, and that the club’s supporters also dominate many of the more 
well-to-do areas in the northeastern parts of the city, such as Djursholm and 
Lindingö. Yet this does not necessarily give an entirely accurate picture of the 
club’s fan base.51 DIF has followers in almost every part of the city (including 
the suburbs),52 and in recent years the club’s base of support likewise seems to be 
44 “Tifogruppen Fabriken,” http://www.jarnkaminerna.se, accessed July 24, 2009; Fabriken, “Historia,” http://
www.fabrikenstockholm.se, accessed July 24, 2009. Like Järnkaminerna, Fabriken is also actively involved 
with the club’s hockey team.
45 Udo Merkel, “Milestones in the Development of Football Fandom in Germany: Global Impacts on Local 
Contests” in Sean Brown, ed., Football Fans Around the World: From Supporters to Fanatics (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), pp. 69-71.
46 DIF supporter and one of the founding members of Fabriken, Martin Lundgren, as cited in Hagström et al., 
Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 166-167.
47 Hagström et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 137-140, 166-167, 170-180.
48 Andersson and Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan?, p.147; Sännås, Black Army, p. 113.
49 Patrick Mignon, “New Supporter Cultures and Identity in France: The Case of Paris Saint-Germain” in 
Richard Giulianotti and John Williams, eds., Game Without Frontiers: Football, Identity and Modernity 
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1994), p. 286.
50 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; author interview with Mats 
Jonsson, June 8, 2010. See also Grimlund and Pavalidis, Djurgården. En supporters handbok, p. 92.
51 Hagström et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 48-49, 160-161.
52 “Stockholm har blivit kallt,” Offside (2008), no. 6, pp. 74-75; Grimlund and Pavalidis, Djurgården. En sup-
porters handbok, p. 48.
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expanding into smaller, more rural communities located outside of the capital.53 
To a certain extent, the team even has a national following with strong footholds 
in places like Jönköping and Göteborg.54 For these reasons, Djurgården is not 
as strongly identified with a single region of Stockholm as either Hammarby or 
AIK, which are associated with the city’s south-side and north-side, respectively. 
That much of DFG’s original core membership came from the city’s southern 
suburbs, from areas such as Huddinge, Hannige, and Hagästra,55 speaks to both 
the geographic spread and socio-economic diversity of the club’s fan base. 
These days, the team’s hooligans come from all parts of greater Stockholm (and 
beyond), though DFG’s core support is still primarily located in more economi-
cally mixed areas, like Hannige, Sollentuna, Hägersten, and Farsta.56
In contrast, it is harder to say anything more definitive about the politics of 
the team’s fans, though in all likelihood most of them are to be found on the right 
side of the political spectrum.57 What we do know is that – like AIK – DIF has 
always garnered support from people from all walks of life, so the club has never 
been exclusively associated with just one particular economic class,58 and this 
appears to be true of DFG’s members as well. While no exact sociological data 
exist about the group’s members, all of the available anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the latter are drawn from a wide variety of vocations and social classes.59 At 
least in this sense, then, they are probably not all that different from the club’s 
non-violent supporters.
Nor is there any reason to believe that DFG’s members are fundamentally 
distinct from other Swedish hooligans, who are generally also thought to be 
socio-economically heterogeneous in origin – encompassing everyone from 
middle-class professionals and students to more hardened criminals.60 Hence, in 
this regard, DFG’s members appear to be less like their British role models (who 
are still overwhelmingly working class)61 and instead more like their Belgian, 
53 http://www.jarnkaminerna.se/artikel/supporterkultur/2009/04/hej-bonder-ar-ni-dif?, accessed July 24, 2009.
54 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, June 18, 2010. See also Martin Persson, JK Syd, as cited in Hagström 
et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 292-293.
55 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Vi sammanfattar de senaste matcherna” (October 9, 2007), 
http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 24, 2009.
56 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; author interview with Mats 
Jonsson, June 18, 2010. A handful of DFG’s members, for example, come from as far away as Uppsala, a 
small university town just north of Stockholm.
57 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, June 18, 2010. However, there are some notable exceptions to this 
general rule of thumb, like Lars Ohly, the current chairman of the Left Party, who is a vocal supporter of the 
club.
58 Andersson and Radmann, “Football Fans in Scandinavia 1900-1997,” p. 144.
59 Stig-Örjan Saether as cited in “Polisen laddar för risksupportrarna,” Folkbladet, March 29, 2008; “Johan,” 
one of DFG’s alleged leaders, as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 2005.
60 “Svårt bryta sig ur firmor,” Dagens Nyheter, July 31, 2002; Tore Brännberg as cited in “Bokar tid – för att 
slåss,” Aftonbladet, May 7, 2005; Dr. Björn Johansson, Department of Social Psychiatry, University of Öre-
bro, as cited in “Huliganlivet: Våld, droger och dyra märkeskläder,” Göteborgs Posten, October 22, 2005.
61 Eric Dunning, Sport Matters: Sociological Studies of Sport, Violence and Civilization (London: Routledge, 
1999), pp. 140, 148; Frosdick and Marsh, Football Hooliganism, pp. 84-91.
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Dutch, German, and Spanish equivalents, who are recruited from a wider range 
of social backgrounds.62
Such heterogeneity notwithstanding, members of the supporter police make 
clear that one is more likely to find blue-collar than white-collar workers among 
Stockholm’s hooligans.63 Police and criminologists also point out that Swedish 
hooligans are statistically more likely to come from troubled family backgrounds 
and to have previous criminal convictions than their generational cohorts.64
One of the more troubling trends among Djurgården’s hooligans over the last 
decade is that they have been implicated in a series of high-profile crimes that 
have no discernable relationship to football violence.65 In one particularly dis-
turbing incident, a known DFG associate was apprehended after he had viciously 
attacked six people in broad daylight with an iron pipe, killing one.66 The inclu-
sion of this type of anti-social personality into the group, speaks to DFG’s capac-
ity for violence.
That having been said, Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar probably has fewer career 
criminals than the other two Stockholm firms, and most of its members seem to 
live relatively ordinary lives outside their hooligan-related activities. The firm 
is, for example, known to have a handful of university graduates and even a few 
small business owners among its ranks, and overall its members are gainfully 
employed.67
Still, there are real limits to DFG’s diversity as some social groups are notice-
ably absent. Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar has no female members, nor can women 
be found in any other Swedish firm. This type of gender-based exclusion is 
extremely unusual in Sweden, either socially or in the workplace. Like elsewhere 
in Europe, Swedish hooliganism is, in effect, an all-male preserve, providing an 
arena in which masculine identities can be ritually reaffirmed and collectively 
celebrated.68
The same point can be made about Swedish football-fan culture as a whole, 
which traditionally has also been very male-dominated.69 The stereotypical mem-
ber of a Swedish supporter club is still a young man, with Swedish-born parents, 
who does not have a university education – though the social base of Swedish fan 
62 Anastassia Tosukala, Football Hooliganism in Europe: Security and Civil Liberties in the Balance (New 
York: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 51, 100-104; Ramón Spaaij, Understanding Football Hooliganism: A Comparison 
of Six Western European Football Clubs (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 27-29.
63 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010.
64 Brottsförbygganderådet, Läktarvåld. Orsaker och åtgärder (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1986), p. 33; Lars 
Sundlöf, supporter police in Malmö, as cited in Andersson and Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan?, p. 127.
65 “Nedsparkad av fem huliganer,” Aftonbladet, July 2, 2007. On this particular occasion, five DFG members 
allegedly attacked someone at random on a subway platform.
66 “De är mycket goda vänner,” Expressen, September 17, 2003.
67 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; author interview with Mats Jons-
son, June 18, 2010. See also former DFG member, “Christian,” as cited by Anders Wigenius, “En kvalitativ 
undersöking av svensk huliganism” (Umeå University, Department of Sociology, 2007), p. 8.
68 Tosukala, Football Hooliganism in Europe, p. 102; Dunning, Sport Matters, pp. 145-150.
69 Philip Leander, “Att vara supporter” in Inrikesdepartementet, Våldet och glädjen, p. 65. See also Sännås, 
Black Army, pp.60-75.
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culture is slowly beginning widen to include other previously excluded groups, 
such as women and second-generation immigrants.70
Men between 18 and 25 years old are the most active in Swedish hooliganism, 
though boys as young as 13 and men as old as 40 (or older) can definitely also 
be found in some Swedish firms.71 In most instances, hooliganism is likely be a 
short-lived phase in these men’s lives, since by its very nature football violence 
is not an activity well suited for men of all ages.
Ethnic and racial minorities are similarly underrepresented in Djurgårdens 
Fina Grabbar. While this is true for most Swedish hooligan groups, in DFG’s 
case it might partially have to do with the fact that the club’s hooligans earlier 
had a reputation for being far-right politically.72 Presumably such right-wing 
sympathies have not completely vanished, but presently DFG claims to have no 
explicit political agenda.73 If anything, in recent years, the group’s public image 
has become decidedly apolitical, verging on hedonistic. In Stockholm, at least, 
the members of Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar have a reputation for enjoying “the 
good life” and are known to use illegal drugs74 – a fact that they do not deny.75 In 
sum, then, DFG’s activities cannot reasonably be interpreted as a form of social 
or political protest. Nor can the group be said to be united by any well-defined 
ideology, beyond fighting for (the rather abstract concept of) Djurgården’s hon-
our. Instead, loyalty to the firm itself appears to be the principal criterion for 
membership; DFG’s members mostly seem to be addicted to the adrenalin rush 
created by violence, as well as by the potency of sharing a common purpose that 
comes with belonging to a tight-knit group of likeminded individuals.76 In this, 
they are not much different from other Swedish hooligans77 or from their coun-
terparts in other parts of Europe.78
A fascination with violence is positively also the key distinction that separates 
DFG’s members from Djurgården’s other younger male supporters. This division 
between DIF’s hooligans and the rest of the club’s supporters was not always so 
marked, however. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, very little, at first glance, 
70 Hagström et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, p. 162.
71 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, March 29 and June 8, 2010. See also “Risk-
supportrar,” http;//www.polisen.se/Stockholm, accessed July 25, 2010.
72 “Nu startar slaget mot läktarvåldet,” Expressen, March 11, 1991; “Här hittar VAM nya medlemmar,” Expressen, 
May 19, 1995.
73 Discussing an incident in which DFG supporters were apparently willing to face off against far-right demonstra-
tors, a DFG blog entry from 2007 states: “We are not political, especially not on match days” [my translation] 
(“Djurgårn’ – Malmö och halvtidsnack” [July 13, 2007], http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 15, 
2008).
74 Björn Persson, supporter police in Stockholm, as cited in “Huliganer värvar 13-åringar,” Dagens Nyheter, 
April 22, 2007; “De flashar med rånpengar på krogen,” Metro, November 11, 2008.
75 “Johan” as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 2005.
76 Former DFG member “Christian ” as cited by Wigenius, “En kvalitativ undersöking av svensk huliganism,” 
pp. 8-9; ex-DIF hooligan Patrik Asplund as cited in “Jag tröttnade på att hata,” Dagen, October 31, 2002.
77 Östen Gustafsson as cited in “Ingen extrem samling busar,” Aftonbladet, August 2, 2002; “Huliganlivet: Våld, 
droger och drya märkeskläder,” Göteborgs Posten, October 22, 2005.
78 John Kerr, Understanding Soccer Hooliganism (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1994), p. 95; Spaaij, 
Understanding Football Hooliganism, pp. 367-381.
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outwardly distinguished the club’s more violent followers from the rank-and-file 
members of the team’s official supporter club, Blue Saints. Established in 1981, 
Blue Saints quickly developed a reputation for engaging in a wide variety of 
asocial behaviour, including public drunkenness, vandalism, and brawling with 
opposing fans and police.79 During this period, Blue Saints seemingly competed 
with AIK’s Black Army for negative headlines, with the result that the fans of 
these two clubs soon became the public face of Swedish hooliganism.80
Events eventually came to a head in October 1995, when a 17-year-old mem-
ber of Blue Saints (later dubbed “Terror Tommy” by the press) invaded the pitch 
and karate-kicked the referee.81 At the time, this incident seemed to capture all 
that was wrong with Swedish football culture – and, above all, with the Blue 
Saints.82 To many, it seemed as if the club had reached a point of no return,83 and 
DIF officials privately worried that the misbehaviour of the team’s fans might 
actually bring down the entire club by driving away sponsors and all of the 
club’s other remaining supporters. In the wake of this episode, Djurgården would 
receive the unenviable distinction of becoming the first Swedish club to play a 
home game in front of an empty arena.84
At this juncture, club officials had finally had enough and hired an outside 
security agency to investigate all of Blue Saints’ members.85 The following 
year – after yet another ugly incident during an away game in Gothenburg – DIF 
Football completely cut ties with the group.86 Beyond the financial damage the 
Blue Saints had caused the club, its antics had an extremely demoralizing impact 
on the team’s players and coaches.87
In 1997, however, Blue Saints would be reincarnated as Järnkaminera, at 
which time its status as an official supporter club was also restored.88 The new 
successor organization at once sought to distance itself from the club’s recent 
79 “Djurgården stoppar svansen,” Expressen, December 11, 1990; “Det är lätt att svina på bortaplan,” Dagens 
Nyheter, April 28, 1992; “Hockeyfans överföll poliser,” Expressen, February 22,1993. Initially much of the 
trouble surrounding the Blue Saints occurred in conjunction with the club’s hockey games.
80 Andersson and Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan?, pp. 123, 126, 141.
81 Only a few hours later, upon being released from police custody, “Tommy” was apprehended again, this time 
for brutally assaulting an AIK supporter. “Tommy” would subsequently be arrested for robbing a post office 
(“Domarn dömde fel – därför hoppade huliganen på honom,” Expressen, October 29, 1995; “Terror Tommy 
misstänkt för postrån,” Expressen, January 11, 2000). See also “Terror Tommy,” http://www.youtube.com, 
accessed August 19, 2010.
82 Andersson and Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan?, p. 130.
83 Hasse Gänger, Djurgårdens IF Fotboll 1899-2006 (Stockholm: Attraktiv Media och Djurgårdens IF Fotboll, 
2007), p. 41; Ystén, Drömmen om Europa, pp. 28-29.
84 Anders Grönhagen, “Spel för tomma läktare” in Inrikesdepartementet, Våldet och glädjen, pp. 59-61; Gän-
ger, Djurgårdens IF Fotboll 1899-2006, p. 41.
85 “Fotbollsklubbarna måste ta över allt ansvar för sina anhängare,” Arbetet, March 29, 1999.
86 “Huliganismen: Djurgården bryter med fansen,” Dagens Nyheter, August 29, 1996.
87 “Lagkaptenen skriver brev till fansen,” Expressen, April 29, 1996; “Djurgården vädjade till sina fans att inte 
komma till matchen,” Expressen, May 3, 1996.
88 The effort to set Blue Saints on a new footing was led by a well-known former DIF hooligan and Neo-Nazi, 
Patrik Asplund (“Blue Saints valde ex-nasisten,” Expressen, September 11, 1996; Patrik Asplund as cited in 
“Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 2008.
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past, strongly condemning both racism and spectator-related violence.89 This 
was done in hopes of improving the image of the club’s supporters, which virtu-
ally everyone – at least initially – also agreed that it did.90
Yet, in retrospect, it is equally clear that, rather than marking a decisive turn-
ing point for the club, Blue Saints’ demise would instead lay the ground work 
for an even more alarming form of hooliganism. Its origins can be traced back to 
1989-1990, when a small group within Blue Saints splintered off to form Järngän-
get (the “Iron Crew”). Järngänget was solely made up of the most violence-prone 
members of Blue Saints, and consequently also of those who were most inter-
ested in causing trouble.91 Järngänget was consciously modelled after the British 
firms, and it immediately regarded itself as a separate entity from the rest of Blue 
Saints,92 which for the most part was non-violent.93
Järngänget, meanwhile, swiftly became known for its viciousness,94 and its 
capacity for violence only multiplied once the group joined forces with people 
like “Terror Tommy” from Babyfirman to establish Djurgårdens Fina Grab-
bar in the summer of 1995.95 Significantly, today’s leaders of DFG all have 
roots in Järngänget/Babyfirman,96 providing an underlying continuity between 
the two eras. Yet there are also important differences between these periods. 
Even after the emergence of Järngänget, Blue Saints’ behaviour – taken as a 
whole – might be better described as disorderly conduct than as centrally orga-
nized hooliganism. One major distinction is that, previously, the violence was 
normally not premeditated or methodical in nature. Moreover, such violence 
was typically confined to events that occurred either directly in conjunction 
with transport to and from games or during the matches themselves.97 Today 
this is no longer always the case. Currently, fan violence among Djurgården’s 
supporters is rarely the result of spontaneous outbursts. It is usually carefully 
planned and sometimes takes place on non-match days. DFG’s activities are 
89 “Supportermanifest” (May 23, 2003), http://www.svenskafans.com, accessed January 28, 2010; Mats Jonsson, 
JK chairman 1999-2005, as cited in “Rekordklack ska lyfta Djurgården,” Svenska Dagbladet, January 5, 2006.
90 “Supportar om Järnkaminera,” Aftonbladet, June 16, 2001; Thomas Ifwer, a life-long DIF supporter and 
match steward, as cited in “Gubbarna på sittplats är det värsta åskådarna,” Aftonbladet August 18, 2001; Bo 
Lundquist as cited in “De har lagt ett pussel värt guld,” Aftonbladet, October 31, 2002.
91 Unidentified member of Järngänget as cited by Andersson and Radmann, Från gentleman till huligan?, p. 125; 
“DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com.
92 “Han är ledaren för järngänget,” Expressen, November 11, 1995; “Snart kommer någon att dö,” Expressen, 
November 8, 1995.
93 An internal survey taken at this time shows that, of Blue Saints’ 3,000 members, only 30 would ever instigate 
violence, while another 20 said that they would only join in if a fight were already in progress (“Fotbollsklub-
barna måste ta över allt ansvar för sina anhängare,” Arbetet, March 29, 1996).
94 “Han är ledaren för järngänget,” Expressen, November 11, 1995; “Snart kommer någon att dö,” Expressen, 
November 8, 1995.
95 “Vi slåss för Djurgården,” Expressen, October 30, 1995; “Snart kommer någon att dö,” Expressen, November 8, 
1995. Babyfirman was mainly made up of people that were still too young to drink legally. For this reason, DIF’s 
younger hooligans held their own separate gatherings.
96 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, June 18, 2010.
97 Longtime Djurgården supporter and former Blue Saints member Lars “Berra” Eisjö as cited in Hagström et al., 
Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 50-51.
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directed by a small nucleus of six or seven people who also enforce a strict 
hierarchy within the group.98 Blue Saints’ actions, conversely, were never this 
well coordinated, and, for this reason, the group’s behaviour was seldom as 
menacing.
A final, crucial, distinction between the two eras is the degree of aggression 
that is now directed at DIF Football from its own hooligans. To be sure, threats 
against club officials were not totally unheard of during the waning days of the 
Blue Saints’ era,99 but, during this period, not even the most violent elements 
among the Blue Saints would ever have dreamed of intimidating the team’s own 
players and coaches or other DIF fans. Such threats have, however, become more 
or less routine in the past five years.
Over the last decade and a half is the distinction between the club’s other 
young male supporters and its hooligans has thus become much sharper. This 
becomes obvious when one looks at Järnkaminerna’s relationship to the club’s 
hooligans. On one hand, JK refuses to be put in the position of informing on 
its fellow DIF supporters, but, on the other, it steadfastly rejects the legiti-
macy of DFG’s self-proclaimed right to fight in the club’s name.100 In 2002 
Järnkaminera underscored its disproval of DFG when it severed all links with 
the group following a brawl in which several of the club’s non-violent sup-
porters were hurt.101 This turn of events created a greater chasm between the 
team’s ordinary supporters and the members of the club’s firm102 – a develop-
ment that, in recent years, has become discernable in a number of other clubs 
as well.103 In Djurgården’s case, the exact nature of the current relationship 
between Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar and the team’s other supporters admit-
tedly remains somewhat ambiguous. DFG itself guesses that most of the club’s 
younger fans privately enjoy the enhanced stature that the firm has supposedly 
brought to DIF.104 This supposition is not implausible, and there is certainly 
some evidence to support it.105 At a minimum, it is clear that some of the club’s 
non-violent supporters do not object to DFG fighting likeminded opponents, 
 98 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; author interview with Mats 
Jonsson, June 18, 2010.
 99 “Snart kommer någon att dö,” Expressen, November 8, 1995; “Flera ledare i Djurgården har hotas,” Expres-
sen, April 26, 1996.
100 “Fråga Styrelsen” (April 3, 2008), signed “Pinocchio Styrelsen,” http://www.difbutiken.se/forum, accessed 
July 14, 2010. In this blog entry Pinocchio underscores JK’s view that, “Violence is never okay in DIF’s 
name” [my translation].
101 “För Djurgården – Mot våldet!” (September 4, 2002), signed “Järnkaminernas Styrelse,” http://www.difbu-
tiken.se/forum, accessed October 13, 2009.
102 Patrik Asplund as cited in “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 2008. According to 
Asplund, while DIF might be “one big family,” it is still undeniable that some of the club’s members do not 
particularly care for DFG, and vice versa.
103 Östen Gustafsson as cited in “Bokar tid – för att slåss,” Aftonbladet, August 2, 2002.
104 “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor.
105 “DFG Sthlm” (August 14, 2006), signed “blålinus,” http://www.difbutiken.se.forum, accessed July 28, 
2010; “DFG” (May 20, 2008), signed “TBS,” http://www.difforum.se, accessed July 28, 2010; “DFG” 
(May 21, 2008), signed “Jack Daniel,” http://www.difforum.se, accessed July 28, 2010.
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as long as the firm does not attack innocent bystanders.106 The problem is that 
DFG has not always abided by this proscription, and innocent people have 
repeatedly been victimized by its violent outbursts.107
When such incidents occur, they invariably upset many of the club’s ordi-
nary supporters who do not want to be associated with this kind of behaviour.108 
Furthermore, it is equally evident that many – if not most – DIF fans worry that 
DFG’s behaviour is tarnishing the club’s image.109 Some of the club’s followers 
also oppose the group on basic pacifist grounds,110 while others complain that 
the firm’s intimidation tactics are an unwelcome distraction that are bound to 
hurt the team’s performance.111 On occasion, DFG’s activities have even sparked 
open protests against the group.112
In short, over the last few years, there have been more and more signs of 
mounting tension over DFG’s behaviour within the club,113 which calls into 
question the oft-repeated claim by the team’s supporters that Djurgården is one 
big family that always sticks together.114 This growing internal division seems 
to have two root causes. First, the team’s successes of the early 2000s brought 
DIF Football a new generation of supporters, whose own personal histories with 
the club were not shaped by the “bad old days” of the late Blue Saints’ era – 
at least, this is DFG’s own interpretation.115 Secondly (and more importantly), 
106 “Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar” (May 4, 2007), signed “Ståhlberg,” http://www.fragbite.com, accessed August 
7, 2009; “Allsvenskan 2008!” (April 26, 2008), signed “Emil,” http://www.kissarmysweden.com, accessed 
August 7, 2009. See also Martin Lundgren as cited in Hagström et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, p. 183.
107 “Skräcken i T-banan. Huliganer gick till attack mot instängda barnfamiljer,” Expressen, May 20, 1997; 
“Flygslagsmål efter förlusten,” Sydsvenska Dagbladet, May 11, 2009.
108 “Huliganer” (October 4, 2004) signed “Niklas,” http://www.dif.se/sidor/fans/klagomuren, accessed May 
19, 2010; Grimlund and Pavalidis, Djurgården. En supporters handbok, pp. 8, 174.
109 Christer Ryderfelt, DIF supporter, as cited in “Huliganbråk i natt,” Aftonbladet, August 30, 2002; “Huli-
ganer” (October 15, 2004), signed “Lars Johansen,” http://www.dif.se/sidor/fans/klagomuren, accessed 
May 19, 2010. In both of these cases, the club’s non-violent fans call upon DIF Football to eradicate the 
internal hooligan problem once and for all.
110 “Säkerhet” (October 4, 2004), signed “Funderingar om policy . . . m.m.,” http://www.dif.se/sidor/fans/
klagomuren, accessed May 19, 2010; “Gästkrönika: Gatuslagsmål är ingen lagsport” (January 19, 2006), 
signed “Blue Stripes,” http://www.svenskafans.com/global/article, accessed January 28, 2010.
111 “DFG” (May 21, 2008), signed “Stained” and “DFG” (July 20, 2008), signed “MarcusofaDown,” http://
www.difforum.se, accessed July 28, 2010.
112 “Rubrik Saknas” (August 12, 2006), signed “Joel Håkonsen,” http://www.svenskafans.com/global/article, 
accessed July 28, 2010; “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 2008. When DFG, for 
example, put up a banner calling for Kjell Jonevret’s resignation, many of the club’s supporters in the seated 
sections of DIF home area, Stadion, let their displeasure be known by booing loudly.
113 This conflict found open expression on JK’s blog in the late summer of 2006, when a number of entries 
openly criticized the firm. DFG, in turn, responded with veiled threats (“DFG Sthlm” [August 13, 2006] 
signed “Mvh DFG Sthlm,” http://www.difbutiken.se/forum, accessed July 28, 2010).
114 For illustrations of statements to this effect, see Martin Lundgren as cited in Hagström et al., Va för jävla 
pack e ni?, pp. 155-156,167-168; Patrik Asplund as cited in “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, 
January 29, 2008.
115 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Några tankar om 2006 först” (April 1, 2007), http://www.
dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 15, 2008. In this blog, DFG reprimands fellow Djurgården fans for 
protesting against its campaign to get the team’s coach (Kjell Jonevret) fired in the previous season.
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once the club’s hooligans began to hold separate gatherings and arrange their 
own transportation to away games in the mid-1990s, they unquestionably created 
more distance between the firm and the rest of the team’s supporters – a reality 
that some DFG elders regret.116 Its increased isolation seems to have given DFG 
somewhat of a “tin ear” in relation to internal objections about its behaviour, as 
the firm tends to respond very defensively to such complaints.117 Identical fric-
tions are at present also manifest within both AIK and Hammarby,118 with their 
respective firms reacting in much the same way to criticism.119
Although DFG spokesmen have conceded to causing the team harm,120 they 
nevertheless insist that the firm represents the club’s best interests.121 In truth, 
however, what club officials and other DIF fans think is in all likelihood not 
much of a concern to DFG. At this point, its primary relationship is no longer 
really with the rest of Djurgården so much as it is with its chief cross-town rival, 
AIK’s Firman Boys (FB). In terms of DFG’s own mythology and self-identity, 
no one else is as important as its arch-nemesis.122
While DFG has of course clashed with other firms (including several for-
eign ones),123 its main conflict has consistently been with AIK’s Firman Boys.124 
In the last decade Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar has, for example, also gone up 
against the violent groupings associated with Hammarby (KGB – Kompis Gän-
get Bajen)125 and Helsingborgs (IF – Frontline),126 but a special animosity is 
nonetheless always reserved for AIK and Firman Boys.127 In the words of a 2007 
116 “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor.
117 “Några tankar om 2006 först,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog; “Till er som hatar firmorna” (October 9, 
2007) ,signed “DFG behövs i Djurgårdsfamiljen,” http://www.debatt.passagen.se, accessed July 25, 2010.
118 “Fotboll ska vara fest och inget annat,” Aftonbladet, August 29, 2006; “Stökiga fans får sponsra Hammarby,” 
Dagens Nyheter, December 28, 2006.
119 Unidentified Hammarby hooligan as cited in “Vi ville ha kaos,” Expressen, August 30, 2006; unidentified 
members of Firman Boys as cited in “I mörkrets hjärta,” Offside (2002), no. 4, pp. 41-58.
120 “Johan” as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 2005; “Åren med Djurgår’n i 
Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor.
121 “DFG Sthlm,” signed “Mvh DFG,” http://www.difbutiken.se/forum; “Några tankar om 2006 först,” http://
www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog.
122 In the worlds of DFG’s Facebook page, “DFG has under its whole existence been in hard conflict against 
AIK’s counterpart, Firman Boys [my translation]” (April 1, 2009), http://www.facebook.com/pages/DFG, 
accessed July 24, 2009.
123 “Huliganbråk i natt,” Aftonbladet, August 30, 2002; “Bråkigt kring Djurgårdens cupmatch,” Dagens 
Nyheter, September 19, 2002.
124 “Varningsskott mot fotbollshuliganer,” Dagens Nyheter, June 3, 2003; “Tack för en skön eftermiddag, “ 
Svenska Dagbladet, May 23, 2005; “Huliganer möttes i jätteslagsmål,” Dagens Nyheter, April 1, 2007.
125 “Huliganbråk i Stockholm,” Dagens Nyheter, October 19, 2008; “Huliganbråk på inner plan defter derbyt,” 
Dagens Nyheter, April 20, 2009. In a 2007 blog entry, DFG makes clear that although “we [DFG] also hate 
Hammarby plenty, we do not hate them nearly as much as AIK” [my translation] (“Inför Bajen – DIF” [June 18, 
2007], http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 15, 2008.
126 “Huliganbråk var planerat. Måndagens slagsmål mellan supportrar till HIF och Djurgården var en sedan 
länge plannerad uppgörelse,” Helsingborgs Dagblad, April 21, 2004; “Fyrtio omhändertogs vid huligan-
bråk,” Dagens Nyheter, November 22, 2008.
127 “Slakten i Vasaparken” (May 15, 2001), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008; “Hat 
derby mot packet” (May 28, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008; “DFG vs. 
FIRMAN BOYS” (March 31, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008.
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DFG blog entry: “A more repulsive club [AIK] and fans cannot be found on this 
planet.”128
Conversely, DFG has on several occasions expressed a begrudging respect for 
Wisemen, IFK Göteborg’s firm,129 and this sentiment appears to be mutual.130 
Even though these two firms have repeatedly brawled, there seems to be no real 
malice between the two groups;131 on occasion, they have also fought side by 
side in international contexts.132 More than any other Swedish firm, Djurgårdens 
Fina Grabbar has been actively involved with violence surrounding the matches 
of the Swedish national team, both abroad and at home.133 At times, even DFG 
and Firman Boys have collaborated, joining to form a Swedish “super-firm” to 
face off against hooligans from other countries,134 though this has never trans-
lated into any long-term truce between the two groups.
AIK has historically always had the largest fan base in Stockholm, and in 
the early years the fierce reputation of its supporter club, Black Army, was 
unmatched in Sweden. There is thus definitely an element of sibling rivalry, 
with Djurgården’s hooligans (and supporters overall) traditionally playing the 
role of little brother. Indeed, in the early days of this conflict, DIF’s hooligans 
fully embraced the identity of being, in their words, “färre, men värre” (“fewer, 
but worse”).135
AIK still draws more fans, but these days the two firms appear to be close in 
size. In 2005 police estimated that both groups could field as many as 100 men 
during certain away games – and perhaps double as many in conjunction with 
key home games.136 Since then, the ranks of both firms have only continued to 
swell, on occasion even reaching as many as 250 to 300 fighters, though in these 
situations many participants are little more than passive onlookers. In any case, 
neither DFG’s core group, nor that of Firman Boys, consists of more than 40 to 
50 individuals.137
128 “Inför Helsingborg-DIF” (September 3, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog. accessed July 15, 2008. 
See also “FC Flora Tallin – Djurgårdens IF ‘Vi ska hugga er . . .’,” http://www.youtube.com, accessed 
August 19, 2010.
129 “DFG-WM” (June 14, 2007), http://www.sc.phpbb2.se/forum/viewtopic, accessed July 15, 2008; “Johan” 
as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 2005.
130 “Här drabbar huliganerna samman,” Expressen, March 2, 2009.
131 “Gärdet. DFG vs. Wisemen” (April 27, 2002), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/krönikor, accessed July 15, 2008; 
“DFG vs. Wisemen i Vårbygård” (June 9, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com, accessed July 15, 2008.
132 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com.
133 “Danmark vs. Sverige 070602” (May 28, 2007), DFG BLOG, http://www.copac.se/blog, accessed October 13, 
2009. This fact is also widely acknowledged by other Swedish hooligan groups; see “Italien-Sverige, Fotboll, 
EM-slutspel (EURO 2004)” (June 18, 2004), http://www.sverigescenen.com/2006, accessed October 13, 2009.
134 Höglund, En av grabbarna, pp. 140-145.
135 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/
krönikor.
136 “Firmorna som ger fotbollen dåligt rykte,” Svenska Dagbladet, May 23, 2005. According to DFG sources, 
the club’s firm usually numbers around 80 to 100, but in an emergency it can call upon maybe as many as 
150 men (“Johan” as cited in “Firmaledaren: Var redo att dö,” Aftonbladet, May 8, 2005.
137 Author interview with Stig-Örjan Saether and Hans Rudolfson, June 8, 2010; author interview with Mats 
Jonsson, June 18, 2010.
238 Histoire sociale / Social History
The veterans of Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar and Firman Boys were both typi-
cally baptized into their respective supporter organizations during the heated 
years of the two clubs’ hockey rivalry in the 1980s. In many ways, the two groups 
are mirror images of each other, and their respective identities have always been 
created principally in opposition to each other. Significantly, both claim to have 
previously been victimized by the other, and this is also central to each group’s 
founding mythology. This idea, moreover, continues to be crucial to both groups’ 
claims to legitimacy, since their raison dÊêtre is fundamentally that each protects 
its own fans from those of the other.138
Firman Boys was founded in 1991 in reaction to the appearance of 
Järngänget;139 this move by AIK hooligans, in turn, informed the subsequent 
decision to consolidate Järngänget and Babyfirman into DFG in 1995.140 In 
hindsight, the establishment of Firman Boys and Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar set 
Swedish hooliganism on a new path, as the most violent supporters of the two 
teams formed their own autonomous units. Eventually this tendency became 
discernable in a number of other clubs as well, and for a while the list of new 
firms seemed to grow almost annually.141
By its own admission, Firman Boys was originally also deeply indebted to 
British hooligan culture, but over time its members have come to regard them-
selves as being more along the lines of the Italian ultras. Similarly to its Italian 
role models, Firman Boys is no longer content just to dominate the terraces, but 
now wants to have a direct say in the club’s personnel decisions, even about the 
team’s style of play.142 FB claims to have significant influence over major club 
decisions, and the group exerts its influence through a pattern of systemic intimi-
dation. It employs coercive threats not only against opposing players and refer-
ees, but also against members of its own club. More specifically, Firman Boys 
has been known to demand “talks” with AIK’s board of directors and coaches, 
and from time to time FB members have likewise stepped in and disciplined the 
club’s own players.143
In recent years, DFG has increasingly come to replicate these methods, 
though it has yet to surpass the audacity and ruthlessness of Firman Boys.144 
138 “Firman Boys-Historien” (2000), http://www.sverigescenen.com, accessed July 15, 2008; unidentified 
members of Firman Boys as cited in “I mörkrets hjärta,” Offside (2002), no. 4, pp. 41-58; “DFG Historia,” 
http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Till er som hatar firmona,” http://www.debatt.passagen.se. According to this 
last blog entry, signed “DFG behövs i Djurgårdsfamiljen,” DFG was created out of self-defence against 
Firman Boys, and the group still acts as a crucial form of protection for other DIF fans.
139 “Firman Boys-Historien,” http://www.sverigescenen.com. See also Sännås, Black Army, pp. 120-122.
140 “DFG Historia,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com; “Åren med Djurgår’n i Sverige,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/
krönikor.
141 “Från flyttat mål till mord,” Aftonbladet, August 3, 2002.
142 Höglund, En av grabbarna, pp. 120-121.
143 “Firman Boys-Historien,” http://www.sverigescenen.com; unidentified members of Firman Boys as cited in 
“I mörkrets hjärta,” Offside (2002), no. 4, pp. 41-58.
144 Firman Boys are notably suspected of having sent a mail bomb to the head of AIK security, and the group 
has also been implicated in one death (“Redo att dö för sitt lag,” Aftonbladet, July 30, 2002; “Kärlek till våld 
och AIK förenar,” Dagens Nyheter, October 20, 2007).
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DFG is rapidly catching up, however, and only Firman Boys has been implicated 
in more violent hooligan-related offences than Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar.145 
In recent years, DFG has, for example, not only tried to intimidate opposing 
players and coaches prior to important matches,146 but has also threatened 
the Swedish Football Association.147 Members of Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar 
have, furthermore, assaulted a handful of Swedish media personalities whom 
they, for one reason or another, perceive to be enemies.148 Most strikingly, per-
haps, in the summer of 2006, DFG launched an aggressive campaign to get the 
team’s coach, Kjell Jonevret, to resign149 – which he did, after two severed pig 
heads with menacing messages were left outside the club’s offices and training 
grounds.150 Two months later, Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar followed this up by 
calling upon the team to throw its last home game to prevent AIK from winning 
the league.151
DFG appears to regard itself as the club’s consciousness,152 demanding that 
both management and players live up to its expectations;153 on at least one occa-
sion its members leapt onto the sidelines in mid-game to make their displeasure 
directly known to the club’s coaches and players.154 Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar 
has, additionally, taken on the role of being the team’s internal disciplinarian. To 
that end, it has sent players home from the bar,155 admonished the club’s supporters 
145 Panu Poutvaara and Mikael Priks, “Hooliganism in the Shadow of a Terrorist Attack: Do Police Reduce 
Group Violence?” (2006), p. 4, http://www.ifo.de/link/_confpast/pse06_programme.htm, accessed July 19, 
2010.
146 “Brandattentat mot AIK-stjärnor,‰ Expressen, September 23, 2007. In this case, DFG was suspected of hav-
ing thrown a flare into the hallway of an apartment building where two AIK players lived. This took place 
just prior to a derby against DIF and was accompanied with derogatory graffiti directed at the two players. 
On a previous occasion, DFG is also alleged to have threatened an opposing coach (“IF Brommapojkarna-
DIF, Fotboll, Div 1 Norra” [August 12, 1997], http://www.sverigescenen.com/1997, accessed October 13, 
2009).
147 In this particular incident, threatening graffiti was found painted outside the offices of the Swedish Football 
Association, declaring “Death to SVFF” signed “DFG” (“Fotbollsförbundets kansli vandaliserat,” Svenska 
Dagbladet, November 10, 2004).
148 “Lille Alex, vi har hittat dig!”, Realtid.se, April 8, 2008, http://www.Realtid.se; “Schulman slogs ner på 
öppen gata,” Expressen, June 2, 2008.
149 On its Facebook page, DFG shows a photo taken in 2006 of a masked hooligan standing in front of a ban-
ner calling for Jonevret’s resignation. The banner’s text reads: “Our patience is beginning to run out. Show 
heart, or change clubs!” [my translation], http://www.facebook.com/pages/DFG, accessed April 1, 2009. 
See also “Fansens attack – mot Jonevret,” Aftonbladet, August 6, 2006.
150 “Fick en sista varning,” Expressen, July 30, 2006.
151 “DFG vill ha läggmatch” (October 2006), http://www.metacafe.com, accessed July 15, 2008; “Lägg-
match” (October 31, 2006), http://www.joe-sthlm.blogspot.com, accessed July 26, 2010. In this blog entry, 
“Djurgårds-Joe” insinuates that a pitch invasion might be necessary to secure the “right result.”
152 According to DFG, “It is we [the fans] that are the club” (unidentified DFG member as cited in “Skyddas 
av polis: Fansen marcherade in på träningen,” Expressen, July 20, 2007).
153 “Vi lämnar inte ut dig,” Aftonbladet, April 27, 2009. In this instance, graffiti was spray-painted outside the 
residence of Djurgården’s goalkeeper, Pa Dembo Touray, declaring “Achieve or Leave DFG” [my transla-
tion]. See also “Några tankar om 2006 först,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog.
154 “Siggi Jónsson hotad av fans efter förlusten,” Expressen, July 13, 2008.
155 “DFG hotar spelare som går på krogen,” Expressen, May19, 2008.
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to show up in greater numbers,156 and, incredibly, even chastised the club’s other 
fans to behave during games.157
This evident radicalization in the group’s behaviour culminated in November 
2009, when four visiting players from Assyriska FF were assaulted following a 
pitch invasion that right after DIF had just heroically managed to stave off relega-
tion with an overtime goal.158 To many, this seemed to represent yet another new 
low point for the club – as one well-known football reporter put it, this was “Ter-
ror Tommy quadrupled.”159 In the wake of this incident, DIF Football was once 
again compelled to pay heavy fines and was further forced to play the following 
season’s first home game in front of an empty arena.160 Seemingly desperate at 
this point, DIF Football called upon the Swedish government to pass new, even 
harsher legislation aimed at curbing hooligan-related offences.161
Consequently, by late 2009, DIF Football once more appeared to be at a seri-
ous crossroads in relation to its own violent supporters. Dating back to at least 
2005, the club’s management and coaching staff have been more or less in open 
conflict with DFG.162 The current situation is therefore very reminiscent of the 
one in which DIF Football found itself only a decade earlier, as club officials yet 
again fret that the team’s hooligans might scare off the rest of the team’s support-
ers, not to mention its sponsors.163 DIF Football wishes that it could simply be 
rid of this group,164 but it has no legal means of doing so. Some football experts 
believe that rising fan violence is hurting gate receipts of the three big Stockholm 
clubs, which have all seen a sharp decline in attendance during the last couple 
of years. They have posited further that intensified pressure on the players from 
their own supporters has negatively affected performance on the pitch.165
Such comments beg the question of how concerned the club hierarchy should 
be about DFG and how much influence the group really has over the team. For 
156 “Djurgårn – TFF” (September 27, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 15, 2008.
157 “DIF – Göteborg” (June 13, 2007), http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog, accessed July 15, 2008. In this 
instance, DFG castigates other DIF supporters for throwing objects on to the pitch.
158 “Djurgårdsupporter slog ner Assyriskaspelare” (November 9, 2009), http;//www.youtube.com, accessed 
July 29, 2010. In this context it is of interest that DFG had on a previous occasion already threatened Assyr-
iska FF (“Fotbollsförbundets kansli vandaliserat,” Svenska Dagbladet, November 10, 2004).
159 Erik Niva, “Det här är Terror Tommy i Kvadrat,” Aftonbladet, November 11, 2009. In the end, no one was 
ever prosecuted for this attack, due to inconclusive evidence (“Dif-huligan friad – får gå på premiären,” 
Aftonbladet, February 8, 2011).
160 “Djurgården inför nykterhetskontroll,” Aftonbladet, February 12, 2010.
161 “Djurgårdens vädjan till politikerna: Inför längre straff för huliganerna,” Aftonbladet, November 10, 2009. See 
also editorial by Tommy Jacobsson, current chairman of DIF Football, in Djurgårdaren (2010), no. 1, pp. 44-45.
162 Bo Lundquist as cited in “En supporter stöder sin klubb, de här förstör enbart för oss,” Aftonbladet, May 6, 
2005; Jonas Riedel, DIF’s media representative, as cited in “Psykkrig bakom rökfakla mot AIK,” Svenska 
Dagbladet, September 24, 2007; Zoran Lukic, coach DIF Football, as cited in “Vi måste ta till kraftag,” 
Aftonbladet, April 27, 2009.
163 Patrik Asplund as cited in “Huliganer har också klubbkänsla,” Dagens Nyheter, September 9, 2008.
164 Bo Lundquist as cited in “Dif:s attack mot våldet,” Aftonbladet, February 23, 2005; Abbe Törsleff, head of 
security, DIF Football, as cited in “Inga enkla lösningar på derbyvåldet,” Dagens Nyheter, October 24, 2008.
165 Jonas Cederquist, Stockholms fotbollshistoria 1880-2010 (Stockholm: Stockholmia förlag, 2010), pp.186, 
188-189; “Stockholm har blivit kallt,” Offside (2008), no. 6, pp. 70-84.
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its part, Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar predictably insists that it has a decisive say 
in club matters, as was demonstrated by Jonevret’s resignation.166 This, however, 
is strongly disputed by Bo Lundquist, the former DIF chairman, who maintains 
that DFG’s threats have been but a minor nuisance to the team.167 Yet, according 
to at least one outside observer, Bo Lundquist was himself later forced to resign 
under pressure from Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar.168 While it is hard to evaluate 
the validity of any of these claims, what we do know is that representatives from 
DFG have been allowed to speak to the team’s coaches169 and that the group has 
also actively tried to assert its will at the club’s membership meetings.170
Mats Jonsson, the head of security at DIF Football, offers a more nuanced 
answer to this question, suggesting that the best way to think about this issue is 
not so much in terms of the group’s influence, but in terms of its effect on the 
team. Jonsson stresses that this is a crucial distinction, for, while DFG does not 
have any direct say in club decisions, its mere intimidating presence – particularly 
its visits to the team’s practice field at Kaknäs – tends to have a negative impact on 
the team.171 In September 2009, for instance, members of DFG were suspected of 
having vandalized the club’s training facility following a demoralizing derby loss 
to AIK.172 Under these circumstances, club officials have felt obliged to warn the 
players about the team’s own hooligans, and the coaching staff has sporadically 
also received police protection.173 Through its actions, DFG has therefore suc-
ceeded in creating a threatening atmosphere around the club.
While certainly still far less violent, DFG’s recent activities are nonetheless 
very reminiscent of its Italian equivalents – and presently, the firm’s ambitions 
must be said to be far grander than its British counterparts, which still, by and 
large, limit themselves to facing off against other firms. On the other hand, DFG 
does not have either the strong ideological profile or the political connections of 
many Italian ultra groups.174 Nor can Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar be said to be run-
ning the errands of the club leadership, which has often been the case in Italy.175 In 
fact, if there is any collusion at all between DFG and the club’s management, so 
far it seems only to be on DFG’s terms – to the detriment of DIF Football.
166 “Några tankar om 2006 först,” http://www.dfgsthlm.com/difblog.
167 Bo Lundquist as cited in “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 2008.
168 Mats Öbrink, head of sports programming at Canal Plus, as cited in “Ekomiskt omöjligt att flytta match-
erna,” Realtid.se, November 14, 2008.
169 Patrik Asplund as cited in “Boxhandskar & silkesvantar,” Sportstory.se, January 29, 2008; “Skyddas av 
polis: Fansen marcherade in på träningen,” Expressen, July 20, 2007.
170 “Lundquist kallad lögnare på DIF-möte,” Expressen, November 13, 2008.
171 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, June 18, 2010. For a specific illustration, see DIF players Johan Oremo 
and Lance Davids as cited in “Klart det var obehagligt,” Aftonbladet, July 13, 2008.
172 “Djurgårdens träningsanläggning vandaliserad,” Aftonbladet, September 29, 2009.
173 “Skyddas av polis: Fansen marcherade in på träningen,” Expressen, July 20, 2007; “Ledningen varnade 
spelarna för fansen,” Aftonbladet, April 27, 2009.
174 Carlo Podaliri and Carlo Balestri, “The Ultras, Racism and Football Culture in Italy” in Brown, ed., Fanatics!, 
pp. 88-100.
175 John Foot, Winning at all Costs: A Scandalous History of Italian Soccer (New York: Nation Books, 2007), 
pp. 302-324, 344-354.
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If it is any consolation, Hammarby and AIK currently find themselves in an 
equally bad, if not worse, position in regard to the same issues.176 AIK Football, for 
example, has tried to handle its hooligan problem in much the same way, but with 
no better result.177 AIK’s leadership has been widely criticized in Sweden for capit-
ulating to its own hooligans by allowing them regular access to team officials.178 If 
anything, the behaviour of Firman Boys has only continued to degenerate, and the 
same observation can definitely be made about DFG – especially from the summer 
of 2006 onward. In DFG’s case, this deterioration has indisputably been driven by 
its rivalry with Firman Boys, as both groups seek to outdo each other at every turn 
in their fierce competition for headlines, local bragging rights, and new recruits.
Twenty years ago the issue of new recruits would have been less of a con-
cern, because at that time a club’s hooligans were still only drawn internally from 
within its own supporter clubs. However, over the past few years team loyalties 
have become less and less important, and the police have determined that prospec-
tive hooligans are increasingly being recruited for their fighting skills alone. The 
result has been a marked upswing in the number of hardened criminal elements in 
the firms and in other groups of people who are solely interested in perpetuating 
violence.179 Mats Jonson, who is responsible for security issues at DIF football, 
guesses that this latter group represents anywhere from 25 to 30 per cent of DFG’s 
current membership. This crowd poses a particularly difficult problem for the 
club because it has no intrinsic sense of loyalty to the team and consequently can-
not be persuaded to act in Djurgården’s best interests.180 The influx of these new 
recruits has thus further distanced DFG from the rest of the club.
Nor can there be any doubt that the radicalization of DFG’s behaviour stems 
from its growing seclusion within the club. As the firm has become a world unto 
itself, more and more cut off from DIF’s other supporters, there are no longer 
any dissenting opinions or voices of reason to temper the group’s actions. Hence, 
like many other types of violent sects, hooligan firms such as DFG are liable to 
become victims of their own negative groupthink. They have progressively come 
to inhabit a mental environment totally removed from any normal frame of refer-
ence, and within this insular world the pursuit of “violence for violence’ sake” 
appears to be totally legitimate to its members.181 Moreover, along the way, these 
sorts of groups (DFG included) often alienate the very people whom they were 
originally supposed to represent. The depth of DFG’s isolation was illustrated in 
176 Cederquist, Stockholms fotbollshistoria, p. 190; “Stockholm har blivit kallt,” Offside (2008), no. 6, pp. 
78-80.
177 “I mörkrets hjärta,” Offside (2002), no. 4, pp. 41-58.
178 “Firmorna får för mycket makt,” Aftonbladet, August 2, 2002; “Kärlek till våld och AIK förenar,” Dagens 
Nyheter, October 20, 2007.
179 Anders Green, Criminologist at the University of Stockholm, as cited in “Off side – Hulganismen flyttar ut 
från arenorna,” Apropå. Brottsförbygganderådets Tidskrift (2007), no. 4, pp. 5-11; Hans Lödahl as cited in 
“Polisen kritisk till nya huliganlagen,” Dagens Nyheter, April 19, 2009.
180 Author interview with Mats Jonsson, June 18, 2010. See also comments by longtime Djurgården supporter 
and former DIF hooligan Tommie Arvidsson as cited in Hagström, et al., Va för jävla pack e ni?, pp. 100-101.
181 This type of thinking can also be found in far more lethal groups like the West German RAF and the Provi-
sional IRA. Jeremy Varon, Bringing the War Home: The Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction and 
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early 2005 when Markus Karlsson, one of Djurgården’s most popular players, 
categorically denounced the group.182
From an outsider’s perspective, there is also a certain irony in the fact that, 
while DFG purports to represent local club interests, it is itself so wholly shaped 
by imported foreign influences. Looking back, DFG has played a central role in 
introducing a previously alien subculture – or cancer – into Swedish sports, albeit 
in a slightly new amalgamation. This, however, begs the question why Swedish 
society has proven so susceptible to the spread of hooliganism. Beyond Swe-
den’s historically strong cultural ties to the Anglo-American world, one might 
speculate that, in a country internationally renowned for its egalitarian gender 
relations, hooliganism offers a crucial platform for the reassertion of earlier ide-
alized forms of masculinity. Indeed, recent European scholarship on this general 
topic has repeatedly underscored the symbolic function that hooliganism serves 
in post-industrial societies like Sweden, where traditional celebrations of male 
physical prowess now find fewer and fewer outlets.183 In Sweden, women can 
be found in prominent positions in virtually every facet of society, from politics 
to private industry; in Sweden, therefore, more than in most Western countries, 
hooliganism truly represents one of the last remaining all-male preserves.
Alternatively – or perhaps concomitantly – it is possible that the relative pros-
perity and socio-economic homogeneity of contemporary Swedish society has 
circuitously (and unconsciously) created a need for new socially constructed iden-
tities and divisions. If true, this would seemingly vindicate the thesis that hooli-
ganism is essentially a form of neo-modern tribalism.184 This is an intriguing idea 
given that Swedish hooliganism is decidedly apolitical in nature – and equally 
importantly because Sweden has few, if any, of the sharp internal regional, lin-
guistic, religious, ethnic, or socio-economic fault-lines that have frequently been 
used to explain spectator-related football violence in other parts of Europe.185 This 
theory seems especially pertinent to DFG’S rivalry with Firman Boys, since the 
socio-economic composition of the two clubs’ fans are nearly identical, despite 
persistent stereotypes to the contrary.186
Internally, however, the members of Djurgårdens Fina Grabbar do not really 
have all that much in common with each other, beyond their gender, age, and to 
a lesser extent ethnicity. Otherwise, the firm is characterized by its geographical 
and sociological diversity. Moreover, the group does not have a set membership, 
  Revolutionary Violence in the Sixties and Seventies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 8, 
12, 75, 212, 225-226; Brendon O’Brien, OÊBrien Pocket History of the IRA (Dublin: The O’Brien Press, 
2003), p. 119.
182 In a letter to the club’s hooligans, Markus Karlsson, former DIF captain, writes that, as far as he is con-
cerned, they can all “go to hell” (Karlsson’s letter as cited in “Dif:s attack mot våldet,” Aftonbladet, Febru-
ary 23, 2005.
183 Richard Giulianotti, Football: A Sociology of the Global Game (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999) p. 
155; Dunning, Sport Matters, pp. 145-150.
184 Gary Armstrong, Football Hooligans: Knowing the Score (New York: Berg Publishing, 1998), pp. 306-307.
185 Spaaij, Understanding Football Hooliganism, pp. 4, 6, 386-392; Dunning, Sport Matters, pp. 155-158.
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nor does it purport to possess a coherent ideological agenda. In fact, it makes no 
claim to a well-defined territory – save possibly for DIF’s home arena Stadion 
and the main watering hole of the club’s supporters, Östra Station. Yet, despite 
this seeming lack of unity of purpose, DFG’s members assert their willingness 
to make huge personal sacrifices for both the group and club: the firm’s slogan 
is “Without Sacrifice, No Victory” (Utan Offer, Ingen Seger).187
With this in mind, one might think of DFG as a localized, or truncated, version 
of Benedict Anderson’s famous thesis on modern nationalism and the creation 
of “imagined communities.” Anderson explains this as an evolutionary process 
in which disparate groups of people come to conceive of themselves as being a 
part of a larger national community that, in truth, is more often fictive than real. 
Nevertheless, the idea is so compelling that people are willing to fight and die 
for it.188 In DFG’s case, the group is of course small enough that its members do 
actually know each other, but their bond is still arguably made up of an “imag-
ined community” of “Djurgårdare,” whose camaraderie is created and continu-
ally reinforced through acts of collective violence.189
Finally, one can further hypothesize that the creation of this type of new local-
ized identity has become all the more important for groups like DFG as Sweden 
becomes more and more integrated into the rest of Europe through the European 
Union. Integration, in conjunction with the accelerated pace of globalization, 
therefore appears to be having the paradoxical effect of leading to increased 
assimilation of foreign influences on one hand and a simultaneous retreat into 
localism on the other. Viewed from this perspective, then, Djurgårdens Fina 
Grabbar might be understood as both a symptom of – and a reaction against – 
the current heightened state of globalism.
This retreat into localism, however, should not necessarily be interpreted as an 
outright rejection of nationalism or of the national state, given DFG’s extensive 
involvement in violence surrounding the Swedish men’s football team. If any-
thing, the group’s apparent willingness to collaborate with other Swedish firms 
within this specific framework suggests that the primacy of the DFG’s localized 
identity has not necessarily wholly supplanted its adherence to more traditional 
forms of Swedish nationalism. Rather, these two distinct identities continue to 
exist side by side, with each given priority depending upon the particular situa-
tion. The paradox here is that, while DFG’s brand of local patriotism is important 
enough to fight for (and possibly even die for), it is simultaneously malleable 
enough deliberately to appropriate foreign influences; as this case study shows, 
this transfer can occur either directly or indirectly through regional proxies.
187 http://www.dfgsthlm.com, accessed July 15, 2008.
188 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, rev. ed., 1991), pp. 5-7.
189 “Djurgårdare” is the plural noun for DIF supporters.
